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HERBERT WECHSLER*
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as it was fashioned during the last
war, Section 9(a) afforded a judicial remedy for the return of property which the
Custodian had no authority to seize. The Draeger Shipping Company case holds
that this statutory remedy is available in this war if the Custodian vests without
authority of law, as his present authority is defined in the First War Powers Act.
My comment is addressed to Mr. McNulty's objections to this result.
First: Mr. McNulty finds in the history of the First War Powers Act evidence
that Section 5(b) was intended to be "unfettered by the rest of the old Act," that
it was designed to be "self-suflicient." Whatever may be the case with respect to
the powers granted by Section 5 (b), I think the conclusion overdrawn if it is taken
to apply to the remedy of judicial return provided by Section 9(a). Section 5(b)
took its present form because Congress, faced with a problem of appalling com-
plexity in determining the provisions of the old Act which had not expired with
the passage of time, chose to make an explicit statement of the substantive powers
conferred. If I read the record aright, this preoccupation with the scope of granted
powers was the dominant theme in Congressional consideration of the bill. It may
be, therefore, that the substantive powers conferred by Section 5(b) may be divorced
in various respects from the limitations upon similar powers as they are embodied
in other provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. But the history of the
legislation is completely silent with respect to the problem of remedies. I read this
to mean that Congress delegated such powers as it did against the background of
traditional remedies, including the remedy for unauthorized seizure provided by
Section 9(a) in terms which do not restrict its continuing vitality. This seems to
me a far more satisfactory inference to draw from Congressional silence than the
inescapable uncertainty as to remedies which Mr. McNulty's conclusion involves. I
should require evidence that Congress regarded Section 9(a) as extinct to reach the
result that it does not apply to vesting under Section 5 (b) and I find no such ev-
idence. I conclude, therefore, that in characterizing Section 5(b) as an amendment
to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Congress placed it in organic relationship
to the judicial remedy of return embodied in Section 9(a).
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Second: That the authority to vest under Section 5 (b) may be exercised by "such
agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President" while
the remedy specified in Section 9(a) runs against the "Alien Property Custodian
or the Treasurer of the United States" does not, in my view, establish that the
two sections are independent of each other. Title I of the First War Powers
Act, in substance almost identical with the Overman Act of x918, empowered the
President, "in matters relating to the conduct of the present war, to make such
redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary,
including any functions, duties, and powers hitherto by law conferred upon any
executive department, commission, bureau, agency, governmental corporation, office,
or officer." In view of the flexibility of any allocation of function under Title I, I
find it difficult to limit remedies by the titles of particular officials rather than the
functions to which they relate.
Third: In so far as it afforded a judicial remedy against unauthorized takings of
property, Section 9(a) was fundamentally undisturbed by the amendment of Sec-
tion 5(b). It continues to be available as a remedy against unauthorized takings
of property. In this connection, the only effect of the amendment of Section 5 (b)
is to authorize takings of property which would have been unauthorized prior to
the amendment.
In so far as Section 5(b) creates a new class of authorized takings, i.e., takings
from foreign nationals who are not enemies within the definition of the old Act,
it reduces the scope of unauthorized takings against which the judicial remedy
afforded by Section 9(a) may be brought to bear. This means that a Federal Dis-
trict Court sitting "in equity," as Section 9(a) provides, would continue to make
the same kind of determination in a suit for return as it would have made under
the old Act. In deciding whether the claimant was "entitled" to have his property
back, however, the court would be bound by the new definition of authority to take
property embodied in Section 5(b) rather than by the old definition embodied in
Section 7(c).
It is apparent, therefore, that I do not share Mr. McNulty's difficulty when he
says (p, T4J): "The trouble is that the literal language of 9(a) would permit any-
body not an enemy or ally of an enemy to step into court and recover for property
even if he is a 'national,' thereby nullifying the vesting that 5 (b) expressly provides
for such a 'national.'" Under the "literal language of 9(a)" a person who is not
an enemy or an ally of enemy but who is nevertheless a foreign national, would not,
in my judgment, be "entitled" to have his property returned, since Section 5(b)
expressly authorizes the taking of such property. I believe, therefore, that a judge
sitting in equity and fully respecting the letter of Section 9(a) would find a stat-
utory bar to an order for return in the language limiting returns to those "entitled"
to the property.
Fourth: If a person other than an enemy or ally of enemy as defined in the
old Act is nevertheless a foreign national within the scope of Section 5 (b), and if
COMMENT ON PROBLEM OF REMEDIES 151
further, he is entitled to immediate compensation under the Fifth Amendment in
accordance with the doctrine of the Russian Volunteer Fleet case, Mr. McNulty
may be right in suggesting that the Tucker Act would afford an appropriate judicial
remedy. But it is not necessary to divorce Section 5 (b) from the Act of which it
is a part to reach this result. The provision in Section 7(c) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act that "the sole relief and remedy of any person having any claim to
any money or other property . . . shall be that provided by the terms of this Act"
is not so clear a barrier to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as Mr. McNulty
assumes. Is a person suing for just compensation a person "having a claim to any
money or other property" seized by the Custodian? Since he would be seeking
pecuniary redress payable only on the theory that such money or property has been
placed beyond his legal power to compel return there is force in the suggestion that
Section 7(c) does not apply. And even if 7(c) applies, there remains the further
possibility that Section 5 (b) has qualified Section 7(c), so far as constitutionally
necessary, to permit access to the Court of Claims.
CONCLUSION
These views accept Section 5(b), as amended, in the posture in which it was
enacted, as an amendment, and, therefore, an organic part of the Trading with the
Enemy Act. If they have no other virtue, they simplify to a considerable extent
the constitutional issues with which Mr. McNulty deals.
